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The equivalence of value and competitive allocations was first established by Shapley 
(1964) in the context of a replicated finite economy with money.  Using the extension 
of the definition  of value  allocation  to exchange  economies  with  non-transferable 
utilities due to Shapley (1969),  a number of authors have studied this equivalence 
for  exchange economies with full  information; see,  e.g.,  Shapley and Shubik (1969), 
Champsaur (1975), Mas-Colell (1977), Aumann and Dreze (1986), Wooders and Zame 
(1987)  for  replica of finite economies, and Aumann (1975), Hart (1977), Dubey and 
Neyman (1984 and 1997) for economies with a continuum of traders. 
Radner (1968 and 1982) introduces a model of exchange economy with differential 
information in which every trader is characterized by a state dependent utility func-
tion, a random initial endowment, an information partition, and a prior belief.  In this 
framework, traders arrange contingent contracts for trading commodities before they 
obtain any information about the realized state of nature.  Radner (1968) extends the 
notion of Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium to this model.  In the definition of 
competitive equilibrium (in the sense of Radner), the information of an agent places 
a restriction on his feasible trades (i.e., his budget set): better information allows for 
more contingent trades (i.e., enlarges the agent's budget set). Thus, in a Radner com-
petitive equilibrium better informed agents are generally,  ceteris paribus, better off 
(and they are never worse off) than those with worse information; i.e., a competitive 
equilibrium rewards the information advantage of a trader. 
AlIen (1991 and 1997) and Krasa and Yannelis (1994) extend Shapley's definition 
of value allocation to differential information economies with a finite number of traders 
/ 
by associating with the economy a cooperative game (a market game) with differential 
information.  This approach is  based on the presumption that agreements within 
coalitions  are reached  ex-ante.  Krasa and Yannelis  (1994)  concentrate mainly  in 
studying the private value;  in this approach the traders of a coalition use only their 
private information (i.e., there is no information exchange).  Einy and Shitovitz (1998) 
show that in a Radner type economy with a continuum of traders the set of private 
value allocations coincides with the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations. 
1 Thus, as  pointed out by Krasa and Yannelis  (1994),  the private value rewards the 
information advantage of a trader. 
An interesting question is  whether the information advantage of a  trader is  re-
warded when we consider the possibility that the members of a coalition may share 
some of their information.  Wilson (1978)  introduces the notion of fine  core for  an 
economy with differential information.  Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (1998) show that 
the set of (weak) fine core allocations of a Radner type economy with a continuum of 
traders coincides with set of competitive allocations of an associated economy with 
symmetric information in which each trader has the "joint information"  of all the 
traders in the original economy.  Krasa and Yannelis  (1994),  using Wilson's ideas 
about information exchange, define the notion of fine value allocation for  a Radner 
type economy by considering a market game associated with the eco~my  in which 
each trader of a  coalition is  given the joint information of all the members of the 
coalition. 
In this work we study the relation between fine value and competitive allocations 
in a Radner type economy with a continuum of traders and a finite number of traders' 
types.  We show that, under appropriate assumptions, the set of fine value allocations 
of the economy coincides  with the set of competitive allocations of an associated 
symmetric information economy in which the traders' information is the joint infor-
mation of all the traders in the original economy.  Thus, whereas when there is  no 
information exchange,  as  established by Einy and Shitovitz (1998),  (private) value 
allocations reward the information advantage of a  trader,  when the possibility of 
sharing information is introduced the information advantage is worthless; e.g., if two 
traders A and B have identical characteristics, except that A is better informed than 
B (i.e., A's information partition is finer than B's) then in a private value allocation 
trader A is  as well off as trader B,  and he may be better off than B;  in a fine value 
allocation, however,  because fine  value allocation are competitive allocations of the 
associated symmetric information economy, both traders are equally well off. 
A difficulty in studying this issue when agents share information is that, unlike in 
the full information case studied by Aumann (1975)  or the private information case 
2 studied by Einy and Shitovitz (1998), the market game associated with the economy 
may not be continuous even when the utility functions of the traders satisfy Auman-
n's (1975)  smoothness assumptions (see Example 3.4).  Therefore the market game 
may not be in any of the classical spaces of non-atomic games studied in Aumann 
and Shapley (1974).  In order to overcome this difficulty  we  use a  recent result of 
Neyman (1998)  who proves the existence of a value on a very general space of non-
atomic games which includes the market games we encounter in our framework.  It is 
possible to obtain similar results for economies with an infinite set of traders' types, 
under somewhat more restrictive assumptions on the traders' utility functions and 
endowments, using the value defined in Merterns (1980).  The proofs of these results, 
however, would be considerably more cumbersome. 
Aumann (1975) conjectured that in a full information economy with a continuum 
of traders the fact the every value allocation is  competitive can be proved without 
the differentiability assumption on the traders' utilities  (which is  assumed both in 
Aumann (1975)  and in Einy and Shitovitz (1998)).  Here using Neyman's value we 
are able to show, without this differentiability assumption, that the set of fine value 
allocations is included in the set of competitive allocations of the associated symmetric 
information economy.  In proving the converse,  however,  we  do use the assumption 
that the utility functions of the traders are differentiable (but in a weaker sense than 
Aumann (1975)). 
2  The Model 
We consider a Radner-type exchange economy £ with differential information (e.g., 
/ 
Radner (1968 and 1982)). 
The space of traders is  a  measure space  (T,~,  fL),  where T  is  a set (the set of 
traders),  ~  is  a <7-field  of subsets of T  (the set of coalitions), and fL  is a non-atomic 
measure on  ~. The commodity space is  ~~. The space of states of nature is  a finite 
set n.  The economy extends over two time periods,  T  =  0,1. Consumption takes 
place at T  =  1.  At T  =  0 there is uncertainty over the state of nature; in this period 
3 traders arrange contracts that may be contingent on the realized state of nature at 
T  =  1.  At  T  =  1 traders do not necessarily  know  which state of nature wEn 
actually occurred,  although they know their own endowments,  and may also  have 
some additional information about the state of nature.  We do not assume, however, 
that traders know their own utility function. 
The information of a trader t  E T  is described by a partition Ilt of n. We denote 
by Ft  the field  generated by Ilt. If  Wo  is  the true state of nature, at T  =  1 trader t 
observes the member of Ilt which contains Wo.  Every trader t  E T  has a probability 
distribution qt  on n which represents his  prior beliefs.  The preferences of a trader 
t  E  T  are represented by a  state dependent utility function,  Ut  : n x  ~~ ~  ~. If x 
is a random bundle (i.e.,  a function from n to ~~) we  denote by ht(x) the expected 
utility from the random bundle x of trader t E T. That is, 
ht(x) =  Lqt(w)Ut(w,x(w)). 
wEn 
Traders' initial endowments are described by a function e : T x n ~  ~~  such that for 
every wEn, e(·,w) is J.L-integrable on T, and for every t  E T, e(t,·) is Ft-measurable; 
e(t, w) represents the initial endowment of trader t  E T  in the state of nature wEn. 
Two traders in T are of the same type if they have the same information partition, 
the same prior, the same initial endowment, and the same utility function.  We assume 
that there is a finite number n of different types of traders. For i  =  1, ... , n we denote 
by 1i  the set of all traders of type i. We assume that for all 1 ~  i  ~  n, 1i  E  ~  and 
J.L(Ti )  >  O.  The information field  of traders of type i  will  be denoted by Fi ,  their 
prior by qi, their utility function by Ui,  and their initial endowment by ei. We assume 
/ 
that for  alII ~  i  ~  n and each non-empty event A E  V~=l:fi, we have qi(A) > O. If 
x : n ~  ~~ is  a random bundle we denote by hi (x)  the expected utility of a trader 
of type i  from x. 
Henceforth an economy £ is a differential information economy with a continuum 
of traders and a finite set of traders' types as described above.  We use the following 
notations.  For two vectors x =  (Xl, ... , Xl) and y =  (YI,""  yL)  in ~l we write x  ~  Y 
when Xk  ~  Yk  for  all  1  ~ k  ~ l,  x  > Y when x  ~ Y and x  #- y, and x »  Y when 
4 Xk  >  Yk  for  all  1 :S  k  :S  l.  A function u  :  ~~ ---+  ~  is  strictly increasing  if for  all 
x, y E  ~~, x > y implies u(x) > u(y). 
Let £ be an economy.  An  assignment  is  a function x  : T  x n ---+  ~~ such that 
for  every wEn the function x(·, w)  is  /L-integrable on T.  A private allocation  is  an 
assignment x such that 
(2.1)  for  all t E T, x(t,.) is Ft-measurable, and 
(2.2)  frx(t,w)d/L:S fre(t,w)d/L for  all wEn. 
A price system is  a non-zero function p : n ---+  ~+. Let t E T  and let Mt be the set 
of all Ft-measurable functions from n to ~~. For a price system p,  define the budget 
set of t  E T  by 
Bt(p) =  {x I  x E Mt and  LP(w). x(w)  :S LP(w) . e(t,w)} . 
wEn  wEn 
A competitive equilibrium  (in the sense of Radner) is a pair (p, x) where p is a price 
system and x is private allocation such that 
(2.3)  for almost all t E T, x(t,·) maximizes ht on Bt(p); and 
A competitive allocation is a private allocation x for which there exists a price system 
p such that (p, x) is a competitive equilibrium. 
Radner  (1982)  noted that, unlike  in full  information economies,  the inequality 
(2.2) cannot be replaced with an equality even if there is free disposal, as the amount 
to be disposed of might not be measurable with respect to the information partition 
of any/single agent.  See  Einy and Shitovitz (1998)  for  an example of an economy 
with differential information which has no competitive equilibrium for which (2.2)  is 
satisfied with equality.  Condition (2.4)  ensures that in an equilibrium the price of a 
commodity which is  in excess supply is zero.  It is implied by Walras' Law,  which is 
satisfied in our framework.  We included it as  an equilibrium condition to facilitate 
comparison to Radner's (1982) definition. 
Throughout the paper we refer to the following conditions: 
5 (A.l) For every wED, IT e(t, w)dJ-l »  o. 
(A.2)  For alII::; i  ::; n there exists wED such that ei(w)  =f.  O. 
(A.3)  For all 1 ~  i  ~ nand wED, Ui(W, 0)  =  O. 
(A.4)  For all 1 ::;  i  ::; nand wED, Ui(W,·)  is continuous, strictly increasing and 
concave on R~. 
(A.5)  For all 1 ::;  i  ::;  nand wED, the partial derivative  {)u8~w,,)  exists at each 
] 
x =  (Xl, . .. ,Xl) E  R~ such that Xj > o. 
Condition (A.l) assures that every commodity is  actually present in the market 
in every state of nature.  Condition (A.2)  implies that every trader is  potentially 
an active trader at some state of nature.  Condition (A.3)  is  just a  normalization 
assumption.  Condition (A.4)  (together with conditions (A.l) - (A.3)) is used below 
to establish that every  (fine)  value allocation is  competitive;  whereas  concavity of 
the traders' utility functions  is  not needed to establish the equivalence of the core 
and the set of competitive allocations, it is required to show the equivalence of value 
and competitive allocations-see  Aumann  (1975)  and Dubey and Neyman  (1997). 
Conditions  (A.3)  - (A.5)  are weaker than those of Aumann (1975)  and Einy and 
Shitovitz (1998).  Aumann (1975)  assumes, in addition, that traders utility functions 
have partial derivatives which are bounded on every compact subset of  ~+. The utility 
function u(x, y)  =  VI + VU,  for  example, satisfies conditions (A.3)  - (A.5),  but do 
not satisfy the assumptions of Aumann (1975).  However,  Aumann (1975)  does not 
assume a finite number of traders' types.  Einy and Shitovitz (1998) assume that the 
traders satisfy the Aumann-Perles Condition (Aumann and Perles (1965)), which is 
/ 
not implied by conditions (A.3) - (A.5). 
3  The market game 
In  this section  we  define  a  class  of non-atomic coalitional games  (market games) 
associated with the economies described in Section 2,  and we derive some properties 
of this class of games. 
6 Let £ be an economy.  A coalitional game, or simply a game, on (T, I;) is a function 
v: E - 3? with v(0) =  O.  Let SEE. Define 
I (S)  =  {j 1 1 5: j  5: nand J.l (S n Tj ) > O} . 
A fine  S -allocation is  an assignment x such that 
(3.1) for  all t E S, x(t,') is  VjEI(S) Frmeasurable, and 
(3.2)  fsx(t,w)dJ.l 5:  fse(t,w)dJ.l for  all wEn 
Denote by A(S) the set of all fine S-allocations.  The market game associated with £ 
is given by 
(3.3)  v(S) =  sup {2:~=1 fsnT; hi(x(t, .))dJ.l1 x EA(S) } . 
For Y =  (Yl,' .. ,Yn) E 3?~ we denote by I(y) its support, i.e., 
Also write 
I(y) =  {j 11  5: j  5: nand Yj  > O} . 
M(y) =  {x :  n - 3?~ 1 x  is  V  Frmeasurable}. 
jEI(y) 
The market function associated with £, f  : 3?~ - 3? is given by 
(3.4) f(y) =  max  {2:~=1 Yihi(xi)  1 xiEM(y), and Vw  E n, 2:~=1 YiXi(W)  5:  2:~=1 Yiei(W)}. 
For every SEE write ~(S) =  (J.l(S n T1), ...  , J.l(S n Tn)). 
Lemma 3.1. Let £  be  an  economy satisfying condition (A.4).  Then v =  f  o~. 
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
/ 
Lemma 3.2. Let £  be  an economy satisfying conditions (A.3)  and (A.4).  Then  f  is 
concave,  homogeneous of degree  one,  non-decreasing on  3?~ and continuous at 0 and 
at  ~(T). 
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
Lemma 3.3.  Let £  be  an  economy satisfying conditions  (A.3)  to  (A.5).  Then  f  is 
continuously differentiable in the interior of 3?~. 
7 Proof:  See the Appendix. 
We note that in the case of full information (e.g., Aumann (1975)), or when there 
is  no information exchange (that is,  when for  each S  E  ~, A(S) is  taken to be the 
set of assignments x which are feasible for S at every state of nature and is such that 
for  all t  E  S,  x(t,.) is  Ft-measurable), a case studied in Einy and Shitovitz (1998), 
the market function f  is  continuous on the range of the vector measure  ~.  As the 
following  example shows,  in our model  (where there is  information exchange)  the 
market function f  may not be continuous. 
Exrunple 3.4. Consider an economy £ in which the space of traders is  ([0,3], B, A), 
where B is the er-field of Borel subsets of [0,3]  and A is the Lebesgue measure.  The 
commodity space is  3?+.  The space of states of nature is  0  =  {w I, W2}.  Let TI  = 
[0,1]' T2  = (1,2]' and T3  = (2,3]. The information partition of a trader. t E TI UT2 is 
III = Il2 = {O}, and that of a trader t  E T3  is Il3 = {{WI}, {W2}}.  The priors of the 
traders are ql  =  (~, ~) and q2  =  (~, ~) for the traders in TI  and T2, respectively, and 
the prior of traders in T3  is q3  arbitrary. All traders have the same initial endowments, 
e(w)  =  2 for  all W  E  0, and the same utility function, u(w, x)  =  In(l + x)  for  all 
(w, x) E n x 3?+.  (Note that u satisfies the assumptions of Aumann (1975) and Einy 
and Shitovitz (1998).)  For this economy, the market function 1 is not continuous at 
~(TI U T2) =  (1,1,0). Indeed a direct computation yields 
10  . 
1(1,1,0) = 2ln 3 =I- -In  2 =  hm 1(1,1, Y3). 
3  Y3-+0 
Y3>O 
Let v be a coalitional game on (T, ~). The core of the game v, denoted by Core(v), 
/ 
is  the set  all finitely  additive measures  A on  (T,~) such that A(T)  =  v(T),  and 
A(S)  ~  v(S) for all S E  ~. The following proposition will be useful in the sequel. 
Proposition 3.5. Let £  be  an  economy satisfying conditions (A.3)  to  (A.5).  Then 
Core(v) =  {V'f(~(T))·~}. 
Proof:  By Lemma 3.1,  v  =  1 o~. Since f  is  homogeneous  of degree one on 
3?~, by Euler's Theorem we have  V'f(~(T))·  ~(T) =  f(~(T)). Therefore by Corollary 
8 4.2  in Einy,  Moreno and Shitovitz  (1999),  Core(v)  =1=  0,  and moreover,  Core(v)  = 
{V'f(~(T))·O. 0 
4  Fine Value Allocations 
In this section we  extend to our economy the definition of fine  value allocations of 
Krasa and Yannelis (1994).  We start with some standard definitions in the theory of 
non-atomic games. 
Let BV be the space of all coalitional games on (T, E) that can be represented as 
the difference of two monotonic games.  (A game on (T, E) is monotonic if for every 
two coalitions SI, S2  E E, SI 2 S2 implies V(SI)  ~  V(S2)')  A non-decreasing sequence 
of sets in E  of the form A : So  ~ SI  ~ ... ~ Sm  is  called a  chain.  For v  E  BV, 
the variation of v over a chain Ais defined by  I/vl/ A  =  2::1 IV(Si) - V(Si-l)1 , and 
the variation norm of v is  defined by  IIvllBV  =  sup {lIvllA  1 A is a chain} . It is  well 
know that (BV,  11  IIBV)  is a Banach space (see, e.g., Proposition 4.3 in Aumann and 
Shapley (1974)). 
Let Q be a subset of BV. A mapping from Q into BV is called positive if it maps 
each monotonic game in Q to a monotonic game in BV. An automorphism on (T, E) 
is  a one to one mapping B from  (T, E) into itself such that for  every S  ~  T, SEE 
iff B(S)  E E. Each automorphism B on (T, E)  induces a linear mapping B*  from BV 
onto itself defined by (B*v)(S)  =  v(B(S)).  A subset Q of BV is  called symmetric if 
B*(Q)  ~ Q for  every automorphism B on (T, E).  A mapping 1/J  from  a symmetric 
subset Q of BV into BV is called symmetric if for every automorphism B on (T, E) 
we  havy B*  o1/J  =  1/J  0  B*.  A mapping 1/J  from  a subset Q of BV into BV is  called 
efficient if for  every v  E  Q  we  have  (1/Jv)(T)  =  v(T). Let Q  be a symmetric linear 
subspace of BV. A value on Q  (in the sense of Aumann and Shapley (1974))  is  a 
linear,  positive,  efficient  and symmetric mapping from  Q into the space FA of all 
bounded finitely additive measures on (T, E). 
Let", be a finite dimensional vector of non-atomic measures on (T, E).  Denote 
by Q(",) the linear subspace of BV of all games of the form go""  where 9 is a real-
9 valued function defined on the range of the vector of measures TJ  which is continuous 
at 0 =  TJ(0)  and TJ(T).  Throughout the rest of the paper, Q will denote the union of 
all the spaces Q(  TJ)  where TJ  ranges over all finite dimensional vectors of non-atomic 
measures on (T, ~). Neyman (1998)  showed that there is  a  value on Q,  which we 
refer to as  Neyman value.  A Neyman value on Q may not be unique, but if v  is  a 
game in Q of the form v =  go  TJ,  where TJ  is a finite dimensional vector of non-atomic 
measures on (T,:E) and 9 is a real-valued function which is concave and homogeneous 
of degree one on the range of TJ,  then for  every two Neyman values 'PI  and 'P2  on Q 
we have 'PIV =  'P2V.  Moreover, if'P is a Neyman value on Q, then 'PV  E Core(v) (see 
Proposition 4 in Neyman (1998)). 
Let E be an economy, and let A =  (AI, ... ,An) E  ~~+. Write E>.  for the economy 
identical to E except that the utility function of every trader of type i, 1 ::;  i  ::;  n, 
is replaced by Aiui. It is clear that if the utility functions of the traders in E satisfy 
anyone of the conditions (A.3)  to (A.5),  then this condition is also satisfied by the 
utility functions of the traders in E>..  Let v>.  be the market game associated with E>., 
and let  J>.  be the corresponding associated market function.  Then by Lemma 3.1, 
v>.  =  f>'  0  e,  where e(8) = (1-£(8 n TI ), ...  , 1-£(8 n Tn))  for all 8  E  :E.  Moreover, if an 
economy E satisfies conditions (A.3)  and (A.4), then by lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, v>.  E Q. 
FUrther, since f>'  is homogeneous of degree one and concave on ~~, if 'PI  and 'P2  are 
two Neyman values on Q then 'PIV>.  =  'P2V>.,  and also if 'P  is  a Neyman value on Q 
then 'PV>.  E Core(v>.). 
We  are now ready to introduce the notion of fine value allocation.  Let E be an 
economy.  A fine allocation x  is a T-allocation; that is, x  is a fine allocation if 
/ 
(4.1) for all t E T, x(t,·) is  V~=I.1i-measurable, and 
(4.2)  fTx(t,w)dl-£::;  fTe(t,w) for  all wE!l. 
A fine  allocation x  is called a fine  value  allocation if there exists A =  (AI ... , An)  E 
~~+ such that for all 8 E :E 
10 where  <p  is  a  Neyman value  on Q.  As  we  noted above,  the allocation x  does  not 
depend on the choice of <p. 
A  fine  value allocation can be interpreted as  a  maximizer of a  "social welfare 
function"  which is  a  weighted average of the traders expected utilities.  Thus,  for 
every 1  ~ i  ~ n, the number Ai  can be interpreted as the weight  in the society of 
a trader of type i.  This definition of fine  value allocation may suggest that we  are 
implicitly assuming  "equal treatment,"  as traders of the same type have the same 
weights.  But as  suggested by Champsaur (1975)  and Aumann and Dreze  (1986), 
each  Ai  can be reinterpreted as  the average  weight  of the traders of type i.  The 
results below establish that equal treatment is  a property of value allocations. 
5  The Equivalence Result 
Let us be given an economy [;, and denote by [;* an economy identical to [;, except for 
the information fields of the traders which for each t ET is taken to be:Ft =  V~=l  :F i . 
Note the information in [;* is symmetric. 
Proposition 5.1.  Assume that an economy [;  satisfies  (A.l)  to  (A.4). Then every 
fine value allocation of [;  is a competitive allocation of [;*. 
Note that unlike in the analogous results of Aumann (1975)  (see Proposition 5.1 
in Aumann  (1975))  and of Einy and Shitovitz  (1998),  in our Proposition 5.1  we 
do not assume that the utility functions of the traders are differentiable.  Aumann 
(1975)  raised the conjecture (in the full information case) that value allocations are 
competjtive even without differentiability of the traders utility functions (see footnote 
17 in Aumann (1975)).  Proposition 5.1 establishes this conjecture for economies with 
a finite number of traders' types. 
Proposition 5.2.  Assume that an economy [;  satisfies  (A.l)  to  (A.5). Then every 
competitive allocation of [;* is a fine value allocation of [;. 
Theorem A below is a direct corollary of propositions 5.1  and 5.2. 
11 Theorem A.  Assume that  an  economy  £  satisfies  (A.l) to  (A.5). Then  the  set of 
fine  value  allocations of £  coincides with the  set of competitive allocations of £*. 
For the proof of Proposition 5.1  we need the notion of weak fine core allocation of 
an economy introduced in AlIen  (1991)  and Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993).  Let 
£ be an economy.  An assignment x  is called a weak fine  core  allocation of £ if 
(5.1)  x  is  a fine  allocation of £, and 
(5.2) there does not exists a coalition S E  ~  with J..l(S)  > 0 and a fine S-allocation y 
such that ht(y(t, .)) > ht(x(t, .)) for almost all t  E S. 
Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (1998) showed that if an economy £ satisfies assump-
tions (A.l) to (AA), then the set of weak fine core allocations of £ coincides with the 
set of competitive allocations of £*  (see Theorem C  in Einy,  Moreno and Shitovitz 
(1998)). 
Proof of Proposition 5.1:  Let x  be a fine value allocation of £, and assume, 
contrary to our claim, that x  is not a competitive allocation of £*. Then by the above 
mentioned result of Einy,  Moreno  and Shitovitz  (1998),  x  is  not a  weak  fine  core 
allocation of £.  Therefore there exists a coalition S E  ~ with I-£(S)  > 0 and a fine 
S-allocation y  of £ such that ht(y(t, .)) > ht(x(t, .)) for almost all t E S. Since x is a 
fine value allocation of £, there exists A =  (Ab ... An)  E ~~+ such that 
where rp  is a Neyman value on Q. Hence 
/ 
But as noted in Section 4,  rpv>..  E Core(v>..).  Therefore 
Since y  is a fine S-allocation, this contradicts the definition of v>...  0 
12 Proof of Proposition 5.2:  Let x be competitive allocation of £*. We show that 
x is a fine value allocation of £. Denote by M  the set of all functions x : n  ---+  ~~ that 
are V7=1 Frmeasurable, and let p be a price system such that (p, x) is a competitive 
equilibrium of £*. The budget set of a trader t  E T  in £* for the price system p is 
B;(p) =  {x E M I LP(w). x(w) ::; LP(w). e(t,w)}. 
wEn  wEn 
For every 1 ::; i  ::; n let 
Si  =  {t  E ~  I  x(t,·) maximizes hi on B;(p)}. 
Then /-L(Si)  =  /-L(~). Let 1 ::; i  ::; n, and consider the problem 
(~) :  s.t. 
LWEnP(w) . x(w)  ::;  LWEnP(w) . ei(w). 
We show that the problem (Pi), 1 ::; i  ::; n, satisfies the Slater Condition (see, e.g., 
page 276 in Duffie (1996)).  As 0 E M, it suffices to show that LWEnP(w) . ei(w) > O. 
By (A.2), there exists Wo  E n such that ei(wO)  =1=  o.  Let A be the atom of the field 
V7=1 Fj  containing Wo·  Since ei  is  .!=i-measurable,  we  have ei  E  M. Therefore ei  is 
constant on A.  For a  E  ~~ denote by ai  the jth coordinate of a.  Let 1 ::;  j  ::;  l be 
such e{(wo)  > O.  We claim that LWEApi(w) > O.  Suppose not; let t E Si  and let Dj 
be the jth unit vector in ~~. Define x : n ---+  ~~ by 
{ 
x(t,w) +  Dj  wE A 
x(w) = 
x(t,w)  otherwise. 
Then x  E M. Moreover, x E B;(p). Since qi(A) > 0 and Ui(W,·)  is strictly increasing 
for  all wEn, we have hi(x) > hi(x(t, .)), which is impossible because t E Si.  Now 
wEn  wEA  wEA 
Therefore LWEnP(w) . ei(w) > O. 
For every 1 ::;  i  ::;  n  let  Xi  be a solution to  (~) (such solution exists because 
x(t,·) is  a solution to (~) for  t  E Si). Then by the Saddle Point Theorem, for every 
13 1  :::;  i  :::;  n there is  Qi  2:  0 such that (Qi' Xi)  is  a saddle point on  ~+ x  M  of the 
Lagrangian Li  of (Pi)'  Moreover, 
(5.3)  Qi(LwEnP(w), Xi(W)  - LWEnP(w), ei(w))  =  O. 
Note that since Ui(W,')  is  strictly increasing for  all wEn and 1 :::;  i  :::;  n,  we  must 
have Qi > O.  Therefore by  (5.3), we have 
(5.4)  2.:wEnP(w) . Xi(W)  =  2.:wEnP(w) . ei(w). 
For all  1 :::;  i  :::;  n let '\ =  ;> and let X E  M. Then as Li(Xi, Qi)  2:  Li(x, Qi)  for  all 
1 :::;  i  :::;  n, (5.4)  yields 
(5.5)  Aihi(Xi)  2: Aihi(X) - LWEnP(w) . (x(w) - ei(w)), 
for  all 1 :::;  i  :::;  n. For every S  E I; let 
We  show that a =  rpv>.,  where A =  (AI,""  An)  and rp  is  a Neyman value on Q. 
Since rpv>.  E Core(v) and by Proposition 3.5  ICore(v>.)I =  1, it suffices to show that 
a E  Core(v>.).  Let S E  I;. We show that a(S)  2:  v>.(S).  In order to prove we  show 
that if y  is a fine S-allocation of E,  then 
Indeed, let y  be a fine  S-allocation of E.  Then y(t,·) E M  for  all t E S.  Hence (5.5) 
yields 
for all 1 :::;  i  :::; nand t E S n Si.  Since y  is a fine S-allocation we have 
/ 
Thus by (5.6), 
a(S) = t 1 Aihi(X(t, .))dJ1- 2: t 1 Aihi(y(t, ·))dJ1-. 
i=l  SnTi  i=l  SnTi 
Hence a(S)  2:  v>.(S).  From the definition of v>.  it is  clear that a(T) :::;  v>.(T).  This 
completes the proof that x is a fine value allocation of £.  0 
14 6  Concluding Remarks 
In this section we discuss an approach that would allow one to obtain an equivalence 
result analogous to Theorem A for  economies with an infinite set of traders' types, 
under somewhat more restrictive assumptions on traders' utility functions and initial 
endowments. 
Let £ be an economy with a finite or an infinite set of traders' types.  The market 
game associated with E is defined analogously to the case of finite types as 
V(S)  =  sup {1 ht(x(t, ·))dJ-l1 x  EA(S)} . 
Let A denote the set of all functions  >.  : T -t ~+ that are bounded and positive 
almost everywhere in T.  For>.  E  A write EA  for  the economy obtained from E by 
replacing the utility function of every trader t E T with >.(t)Ut;  also write VA for the 
market game associated with EA. 
It can be shown that if traders' utility functions satisfy the assumptions in Au-
mann (1975)  (see also Dubey and Neyman (1997)),  and if their initial endowments 
are strictly positive at every state of nature, then every market game VA belongs to a 
space of coalitional games (called DIFF) studied by Mertens (1980), who shows that 
on this space of games there is  a value.  Moreover, the value of a market game VA is 
the unique point in its core (see Proposition 4 in Mertens (1980)). 
We can therefore use Mertens's (1980) value on the space DIFF to define the notion 
of value allocation analogously to the case of finite types.  Let £ be an economy.  A 
fine allocation x  is a fine value allocation if there exists>. E A such that for  all SEE 
/  (<PVA)(S)  = 1  >'(t)ht(x(t, ·))dJ-l, 
where  <P  is  a Mertens's value on DIFF. By arguments essentially identical to those 
used in the proof of Theorem A it can be shown that the set of fine value allocations 
of the economy E coincides with the set of competitive allocations of the associated 
economy £*. 
Providing formal  proofs of these results would require to introduce the theoret-
ical  framework  of Mertens  (1980),  and it  will  make the proofs  considerably more 
15 cumbersome.  Note also that, since the assumptions on the traders' utility functions 
and endowments required to work on this framework are more restrictive than those 
we  have used for  finite type economies, the result suggested above is  not a straight 
generalization of that obtained in Section 5 for  finite type economies. 
7  Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 3.1:  Let S  E  ~. We  first show that v(S) 2  f(~(S)). Note that 
1(~(S)) =  I(S). Let Xl,""  Xn be VjEI(S) Frmeasurable functions from n to ~~  such 
that 
n 
f(~(S)) = L t-t(S n Ti)hi(Xi)' 
i=l 
For every (t, w)  ET x n let 
{ 
Xi(W) 
x(t,w) =  0 
t  E~ 
otherwise. 
Then for every t  E T, x(t,') is VjEI(S) Frmeasurable, and for every wEn we have 
1  x(t,w)dt-t =  :tt-t(Sn~)Xi(W) ~  :tt-t(Sn~)ei(W)' 
S  i=l  i=l 
Therefore x is  an S-allocation and thus 
It remains to show that v(S)  ~  f(~(S)). Let x  E  A(S). For every 1  ~ i  ~ nand 
wEn define 
/  { 
(S~T-) Isnr.. x(t, w)dt-t  i  E I(S)  Xi(W)  =  J1- ,  , 
o  otherwise. 
Since x  E A(S), for all t E T, x(t,·) is constant on the atoms of the field VjEI(S) Fj , 
and so is Xi for all is 1 ~  i  ~  n. Therefore Xi is VjEI(S) Frmeasurable for alII ~  i  ~  n. 
Now for  all wEn we have 
n 
L t-t(S n  ~)Xi(W) 
i=l  :t 1 x(  t, w)dt-t = 1  x(  t, w)dJ-t 
i=l  SnTi  S 
< 1  e(t, w)dJ-t  = :t  J-t(S n ~)ei(W)' 




Since for alII ~  i  ~  nand wEn the function Ui(W,·)  is concave on ~~, the function 
hi  is concave on (R~)n. Therefore Jensen's inequality yields 
for every i  E I (S).  Hence 
Since x is an arbitrary member of A(S), we must have f(((S)) ~  v(S).  0 
Proof of Lemma 3.2:  We first show that f  is concave on R~. Let yl, y2  E  R~, 
and 0 < a < 1. Denote y =  ayl + (1-a)y2. Then I(y) =  I(yl) U I(y2). Let xi ... ,x~ 
be members of (R~ll such that f(yl) =  ~7=1 ylhi(xD, and f(y2)  =  ~7=1  y;hi(xn. 
For every wEn and 1 ~  i  ~  n let 
{ 
Qytxt(w)+(l-Q)Y~x~(w) 
Xi(W)  =  Yi 
o 
i  E I(y) 
otherwise. 
Now  for  all  1  ~ i  ~ n the function  xl  is  VjEI(yl) Frmeasurable,  and x;  is 
V  jEI(y2) Frmeasurable.  As  I (y)  =  I (yl) U I (y2),  for  all  1  ~ i  ~ n  the functions 
xl and x; are VjEI(y) .1j-measurable, and thus Xi  is  VjEI(y) .1j-measurable.  Also for 
all wEn we have 
n  n  n 
LYiXi(W)  a LY;X;(W) + (1 - a) LY;X;(W) 
i=l  i=l  i=l 
n  n  n 
/ 
<  a Ly;e;(w) + (1 - a) Ly;e;(w) =  LYiei(W). 
i=l  i=l  i=l 
Therefore 
n 
f(y)  ~ LYihi(Xi). 
i=l 
Since for alII ~  i  ~  n the function hi  is concave on (R~)n, we have 
17 n  n 
a Lylhi(x}) + (1- a) Ly;hi(x;) 
i=l  i=l 
af(yl) + (1 - a)f(y2). 
This shows that J is concave on 3?~. 
It is clear that J is homogeneous of degree one.  We show that J is non-decreasing 
on  3?~. Let y, z  E  3?~ such that y  ;::::  z.  Then y - z  E  3?~. Since f  is  concave and 
homogeneous of degree one, it is super  additive.  Therefore 
J(y) =  f((y - z) + z)  ;::::  f(y - z) + J(z). 
Since J is non-negative, we have J(y)  ;::::  J(z). Thus J is non-decreasing on 3?~. 
The continuity of J at ~(T) follows  from the fact that J is concave on  3?~ and 
~(T) is  in the interior of 3?~. We show that f  is  continuous at O.  Let {yk}k::l  be a 
sequence in 3?~ such that limk-+oo yk  =  O.  Then there exists ko  such that for all k  ;::::  ko 
we have 
max {yf lIS. i  :::; n} < 1. 
For every k let x~, ...  ,x~ be members of (3?~)n such that 
n 
f(yk) =  Lyfhi(Xn. 
i=l 
Since for  all 1 :::;  i  :::;  nand wEn the function Ui(W,·)  is concave, for  all k  ;::::  ko  we 
have 
n 
o  <  J(yk) =  L  Lyfqi(W)Ui(W,  x~(w)) 
i=l wEn 
n 
/  <  L  L  qi(W)Ui(W, yfx7(w)) 
i=l wEn 
n  n 
<  L  L  qi(W)Ui(W, Lyjej(w)). 
i=l  wEn  j=l 
As limk-+oo L:;=l yjej(w) =  0 for all W E 0, (A.3)  and (AA) imply that 
lim J(yk)  =  0 =  f(O). 
k-+oo 
Thus, J is continuous at o.  0 
18 Proof of Lemma 3.3:  The proof is based on the idea of the proof of Proposition 
34.13 in Aumann and Shapley (1974). 
Let a E  ~~+, and let  1  ~ i  ~ n.  We  first  show that the partial derivative  g~ 




Define the function 9 : ~++  ---t  ~  for  Yl  E ~++ by 
For every Yl  E ~++ let 
Then !I(al) =  f(a).  Now for every Yl  E ~++, ~XI is  VjEI(a) Frmeasurable, and for 
allwEO 
Therefore 
Now since for  every w E 0, and every 1 ~  i  ~  n,  8u~iw,,)  exists at (Xl ... , Xl)  E ~~ 
J 
whenever Xj  > 0 (1  ~  j  ~ l), the function 9 is  differentiable at YI.  As f  is  concave 
on ~~, !I is  concave on  ~++. Therefore there exists an affine function l such that 
for  all  YI  E  ~++, !I(YI)  ~ l(YI),  and !I(al)  =  l(al).  Since 9  ~ !I ~ l on  ~++ 
and g(al) = !I(al) = l(al), 9  and l have the same derivative at al. Therefore !I is 
/ 
differentiable at al. Now by using the concavity of f on ~~, it can be proved (as in the 
proof of Proposition 39.1 in Aumann and Shapley (1974)) that the partial derivative 
:~ is continuous in the interior of ~~. 0 
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